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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN INVESTMENT 
COMPANY, a Partnership composed 
of ,V. ADRIAN WRIGHT, W. 
MEEKS WIRTHLIN, and A. P. 
NEILSON, Plaintiff:.. Respondent~ 
vs. 
JERRY SINE and DORA T. SINE, 
his wife, Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 
9622 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
'STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
'The Plaintiff seeks to vitiate a restrictive covenant 
contained in a Quit-Claim Deed and Assignment of 
Contract. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The _case: was tried to the Court. From a. judgment 
by the District Court for Plaintiff, Defendants appeal. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL. 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellants' Statement of Facts is characterized by 
misinterpretation of the evidence and unwarranted in-
ferences. We therefore deem it necessary to restate the 
facts. 
THE FACTS 
The property in question is a parcel 40 feet wide 
and 97 feet deep. The 40 feet constitute frontage on 
the North side of North Temple Street, approximately 
141.5 feet West of the Northwest corner of the inter-
section of North Temple and· 2nd West Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah (Exhibits 1, 5, and 9). 
Prior to September 22, 1960, this property was 
owned by one Steleanos E. Fendrelakis. Jerry Sine 
and Dora T. Sine, his wife, by Assignment of Contract, 
acquired an interest in the subject property as contract 
buyers on September 24, 1955 (Exhibit 7). This prop-
erty contained an antiquated apartment house re-
modeled from an older home, containing approximately 
8 units (R. 106 and 110). 
On October 29, 1956, the subject property was 
sold to A. P. Nielson for $16,500.00 by the Appellants 
Jerry Sine and Dora T. Sine, his wife. This transaction 
consisted of a Quit-Claim Deed executed by the said 
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Jerry Sine and Dora T. Sine, his wife, in favor of A. P. 
Neilson and an assignment of the Fendrelakis contract 
( R. 106 and Exhibits 7 and 1) . The Quit-Claim Deed 
and Assignment of Contract contained the following 
notation: "This property shall not be used for the erec-
tion of a motel thereon" (Exhibits 1 and 7) . 
On November 5, 1956, A. P. Neilson and Lillie 
M. Neilson, his wife, conveyed to W. Adrian Wright 
and Edna S. Wright, his wife, an undivided one-third 
interest, and W. Meeks ·wirthlin and Betty J o G. 
Wirthlin, his wife, an undivided one-third interest in 
the subject property (Exhibit 2 and R. 13). 
On November 21, 1956, the property was again 
conveyed by A. P. Neilson and Lillie M. Neilson, his 
wife, W. Adrian Wright and Edna S. Wright, his 
wife, and W. Meeks Wirthlin and Betty JoG. Wirth .. 
lin, his wife, to the Metropolitan Investment Company, 
a Co-Partnership consisting of W. Adrian Wright, 
W. Meeks Wirthlin, and A. P. Neilson (Exhibit 4, 
R. 13). 
By .Warranty Deed dated September 22, 1960, 
the fee owner of the subject property, Steleanos E. 
Fendrelakis, conveyed the subject property to the 
Metropolitan Investment Company (Exhibit 3, R. 13) . 
Jerry Sine and Dora T. Sine, his wife, are partners 
who have engaged in the motel business for approxi-
mately 14 years (R. 96}. They operate two motels, 
one known as the Se Rancho Motor Lodge at 640 West 
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North Temple Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, approxi-
mately 3 blocks West of the property in question, and 
Scotty's Romney Motel located on North Temple 
Street, between 6th and 7th West, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, approximately 4 blocks west of the subject prop-
erty ( R .. 63 and 67) . Said properties also being sepa-
rated from the subject property by the Salt Lake 
viaduct and railroad tracks ( R. 33 and 54) . 
At the time of the purchase of the subject prop-
erty, A. P. Neilson did not contemplate the construction 
of a motel thereon ( R. 22) , nor did the partnership, 
Metropolitan Investment Company, which later ac-
quired title (R. 47). 
Mr. Sine testified that the purchase of this property 
from Mr. Fendrelakis was for the purpose of prevent-
ing a motel from being constructed upon the property 
between 2nd and 3rd ':Vest Streets, Salt Lake City, 
Utah (R. 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 68, and 70). He further 
testified that the property was not large enough to be 
of any real value as a motel site (R. 52), and that the 
most it would accommodate as a motel would be 3 or 4 
or 5 units (R. 69), and that, in fact, the construction 
of 6 motel units upon the property would not materially 
affect his motel business or other property holdings 
(R. 96). 
Western Travel, Inc., a corporation engaged in 
the motel business, which acquired the subject prop-
erty by Agreement dated September 30, 1960, (Exhibit 
10), plans to construct upon its own properties sur-
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rounding the subject property, a motel development 
of approximately 130 units, together with restaurant 
and swimming pool, and if the subject property can be 
utilized as part of this development, the number of 
units would be increased by approximately 6 (R. 73, 
74, and 75). Said corporation intends to construct a 
motel upon the properties surrounding the subject 
property regardless of the outcome of the lawsuit. The 
subject property is of such a nature as to prevent the 
optimum use of the adjoining properties owned by 
Western Travel, Inc., and constitutes a peninsula 40 
feet by 97 feet into the properties of Western Travel, 
Inc., that Is to be utilized as a motel (R. 82, 84, and 85). 
In 1956, the structures located upon the subject 
property were old, dilapidated, and in a tenement type 
of· neighborhood and were in dire need of repair and 
difficult to keep rented (R. 34, 109, 110). Also, in 
October, 1956, the property was zoned B-3, which is 
limited commercial property suitable for motel and 
general commercial business (R. 36), and within a 
radius of 2 blocks of the subject property there existed 
4 motels as follows: Ruth Motel: 12 units; Western 
Motel: 29 units; Covered Wagon Motel: 32 units ; and 
Temple Motel: 1~ units, for a total of 91 motel units. 
The balance of the neighborhood consisted of relatively 
old homes converted into apartments and commercial 
establishments ( R. 27 and 28) . 
From October, 1956, to date of trial, December 1, 
1956, there had been constructed within the same area 
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described above the following: Harman Cafe; Utah 
Motor Lodge: 156 units; City Center Motel: 26 units; 
Travel Lodge Motel: 55 units; Travel Lodge: 52 units; 
and Townhouse Motel: 48 units, an increase of 337 
motel units or 470lj'o (R. 29, 30, 31). Also, there has 
been other new construction in the vicinity of the sub-
ject, property including service stations, parking lots, 
and the removal of old, antiquated buildings (R. 31 
and 32). 
Western Travel, Inc., purchased the properties 
of Metropolitan Investment Company surrounding and 
including the subject property, for the sum of $200,-
000.00, for which they agreed to pay cash and 105,000 
shares of the capital stock of said corporation, of a par 
value of $1.00 per share, to the partners, A. P. Neilson, 
W. Adrian Wright, and W. Meeks Wirthlin, 35,000 
shares to each of said parties, (R. 37, 38, 83, and Ex-
hibit 10) the amount of stock received by the partners, 
A. P. Neilson, W. Adrian Wright, and W. Meeks 
Wirthlin being less than 12lj'o of the outstanding stock 
of said Western Travel, Inc., and none of said partners 
being officers or directors of said corporation (R. 83 
and 84). 
POINTS URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD DOES SUP-
PORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING 
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(NO. 18) THAT SINCE OCTOBER, 1956, 
THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT AND SUB-
STANTIAL CHANGE IN THE NEIGHBOR-
HOOD AND AREA SURROUNDING THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT (NO. 14, NO. 22) THAT THE SAID 
RESTRICTION WAS LIMITED TO CON-
STRUCTION BY A. P. NEILSON PERSON-
ALLY IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, 
HOWEVER, SUCH A FINDING WAS NOT 
NECESSARY TO THE CONCLUSION 
REACHED BY THE COURT AND THAT 
THE JUDGMENT IS AMPLY SUPPORTED 
BY OTHER EVIDENCE THAT MAKES THE 
RESTRICTION VOIDABLE. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
THAT MR. AND MRS. SINE, THE APPEL-
LANTS HEREIN, AND ALL WHO MAY 
CLAIM UNDER THEM, HAVE NO RIGHT 
WHATSOEVER IN THE PROPERTY IS 
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND 
THE LAW APPLICABLE THERETO. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EVIDENCE OF RECORD DOES SUP-
PORT THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING 
(NO. 18) THAT SINCE OCTOBER, 1956, 
THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT AND SUB-
STANTIAL CHANGE IN THE NEIGHBOR-
I-IOOD AND AREA SURROUNDING THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
The witness, W. Meeks Wirthlin, testified that he 
has been a real estate salesman since 1946 and a real 
estate broker since 1948, and fl1rther testified that he 
has been engag~d in the purchase and sale of property 
and various business investment transactions in the 
State of Utah since 1946 (R. 23 and 24). He further 
testified that he was familiar with the area within a 
radius of two blocks of North Temple and 2nd West 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, and testified in respect 
to the change of circumstances that have taken place 
in that area since October, 1956. His is the only testi-
mony on the subject and from Mr. Wirthlin, facts were 
elicited concerning the motels that have been con-
structed since October, 1956, and the change in the 
character of the neighborhood. 
Since October, 1956, there have been constructed 
5 motels totaling 337 rental units within a two block 
radius of the subject property purchased from Jerry 
Sine and Dora T. Sine, his wife, and in addition thereto, 
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there has been the construction of the Harman Cafe 
and two service stations. Older buildings have been 
eradicated and at least one parking lot established (R. 
25-34 and Exhibit 5) . 
Mr. Wirthlin testified that in his opinion, there 
has been a substantial change in the character of the 
neighborhood surrounding the subject property (R. 
33 and 34). He further testified that the property in 
question would not have great utility or commercial 
value except in conjunction with other properties sur-
rounding it, this being because of the size of the parcel 
of land, building restrictions imposed by City Ordi-
nance, and parking restrictions ( R. 36 and 37) . 
There being no substantial dispute of Mr. Wirth-
lin's testimony as to the character of the neighborhood 
nor as to his qualifications as an expert giving such 
testimony, it could be assumed that the trial court be-
lieved the testimony offered by the Respondent. How-
ever, even assuming that a conflict of facts existed 
concerning this issue, the Court is nevertheless the 
trier of this fact and its finding, when based upon sub-
stantial evidence such as that offered by the Respondent, 
will not be reviewed. In support of this we cite: Gappa-
var v. Scheuman, 1957, 51 Wash., 2d 55, 350 P.2d 649: 
"A finding of the trial court in respect to facts 
proved will not be reviewed by the Supreme 
Court on a legal question. In any event, the 
Supreme Court will not substitute itself for the 
trier of fact to determine factual matters." 
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In O'Gara v. Findlay, 6 U.2d 102, 306 Pac. 2d 
1073, the Supreme Court of the State of Utah said: 
"The main contention upon appeal is that 
there was no valid delivery of the deed in ques-
tion. In reviewing this contention, we will keep 
in mind the fact that the trial court found a valid 
delivery. Since this is true, we will not overturn 
its decision unless it is manifest that the trial 
court misapplied proven facts or made findings 
clearly against the weight of the evidence." 
'' * * * We are not inclined to overturn the 
:findings of the trial court when supported by 
the uncontradicted testimony of all the witnesses, 
which is unrefuted by the documentary evidence 
involved, nor are we aware of any rule of law 
that would permit us to do so." 
In Wolff v. Fallon (Cal. Dist. Ct. of Appeal) 
269 Pac. 2d 630, the Court said: 
"It is well established that the right to relief 
from restrictive covenants such as those herein, 
depends upon the facts of each case. The findings 
of the trial court in such a case are entitled to the 
same weight as in any other case, and if based 
on any substantial evidence, they are :final." 
Strong v. Hancock, 201 Cas. 530; 258 P. 60; 
Robertson v. Nichols, 92 Cal. App. 2d 201, 207; 
206 p .2d 898. 
In Key v. McCabe, 356 P.2d 169, the Supreme 
Court of the State of California said: 
"The trial court concluded that the building 
restrictions were unenforceable against Defend-
ants' lot." 
10 
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"This is the sole question presented for deter-
mination: Is there substantial evidence in the 
record to support the findings of fact set forth 
above?n 
'"'"Yes. The rule is established that when a find-
ing of fact is attacked on the ground that there 
is not any substantial evidence to sustain it, the 
power of the appellate court begins and ends 
with a determination as to whether there is any 
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontra-
dicted, which will support the finding of fact. 
(Primm v. Pri1nm, 45 Cal. 2d 690, 293 (1), 
299 P.2d 231.)" 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT (NO. 14, NO. 22) THAT THE SAID 
RESTRICTION WAS LIMITED TO CON-
STRUCTION BY A. P. NEILSON PERSON-
ALLY IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, 
HOWEVER, SUCH A FINDING WAS NOT 
NECESSARY TO THE CONCLUSION 
REACHED BY THE COURT AND THAT 
THE JUDGMENT IS AMPLY SUPPORTED 
BY OTHER EVIDENCE THAT MAKES THE 
RESTRICTION VOIDABLE. 
The language contained in the Quit-Claim Deed 
and Assignment of Contract (Exhibits 1 and 7), is 
subject to more than one interpretation. It could be 
considered as a covenant which runs with the land or 
could be considered as a personal covenant applying 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
only to the Grantee and Assignee named therein. The 
nature of the covenant can only be determined from 
the intent of the parties at the time of its imposition. 
Mr. A. P. Neilson testified that he himself did not 
intend or desire to build a motel upon the subject prem-
ises and from such testimony, the Court could clearly 
conclude that the Grantee accepted the Deed and As-
signment with the full kl1owledge and understanding 
that the restriction was to apply to him only and not 
be binding upon his heirs, successors, or assigns (R. 
22). 
The covenant herein involved is somewhat akin to 
the covenant contained in the case of Parrish v. Rich-
ards, 8 Utah 2d 419; 336 P.2d 122. In this case the 
Court said: 
" * * * We will not overturn its decesion unless 
it is manifest that the trial court has misapplied 
proven facts or made findings clearly against the 
weight of the evidence. 
"The trial court followed the correct doctrine 
that in· the construction of an uncertain or am-
biguous restrictions, the courts will resolve all 
doubts in favor of the free and unrestricted use 
of property, and that it ·will 'have recourse to 
every aid, rule, or canon of construction to ascer-
tain the intention of the parties.'" " 
In 26 C.J.S. 1094, Section 162 (3) it is stated: 
"In construing restrictions on the use of prop-
erty, the intention of the parties, as gathered 
from the surrounding circumstances and the 
purpose of the restriction, must be considered 
12 
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and given effect. Such restrictions are strictly 
construed against the parties seeking to enforce 
them and should not be extended by construction 
or implication beyond the clear meaning of their 
terms; and all doubts are resolved in favor of 
the free use of property." 
(See also 14 Am. J ur. 621, Section 212; 26 C.J.S. 
1138, 167). 
' In the instant case, the intention of the parties is 
not made clear upon the face of the instrument. It is 
ambiguous and uncertain and no time for its duration 
is specified nor is the same specifically made binding 
upon the heirs, successors, or assigns of the Grantee. 
Furthermore, the testimony of Mr. Sine would suggest 
and indicate that he was more concerned about A. P. 
Neilson as a "motel man" than any other factor (R. 
51-52). Such being the circumstance, based upon the 
testimony of the various witnesses, the Court could 
reasonably conclude that it was the intention of the 
parties that the covenant in1posed was of a personal 
nature only and would expire upon the transfer and 
conveyance of the interest of Mr. Neilson to a subse-
quent Grantee or Assignee. (See the recent case of 
Smith, et al, v. Second Church of Christ, 87 Ariz. 400; 
351 P.2d 1104 at Pages 1110-1111). 
Regardless of the conclusion reached by the Court 
with respect to this covenant being personal or one that 
runs with the land, there does not exist sufficient basis 
to reverse the trial court's judgment, as the covenant 
fails for reasons that will be argued under Point III, 
13 
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and therefore the finding of the court in this regard is 
not conclusive of the final determination. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S DECISION 
THAT MR. AND MRS. SINE, THE APPEL-
LANTS HEREIN, AND ALL WHO MAY 
CLAIM UNDER THEM, HAVE NO RIGHT 
WHATSOEVER IN THE PROPERTY IS 
FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE FACTS AND 
THE LAW APPLICABLE THERETO. 
The Appellants, in their Brief, have seen fit to sub-
divide the discussion of Point III into several sub-
topics. This Brief will answer each sub-topic through 
a general discussion rather than make a separate dis-
cussion of each sub-topic. 
In each case cited by the Appellants in support 
of this Point, there appears to be a benefit running to 
the exactor of the covenant. In the case before this 
Court, the Appellants imposed the restriction in the 
Assignment of Real Estate Contract and the Quit-
Claim Deed, and such restriction constitutes a detriment 
upon the land of the Respondent but confers no benefit 
whatever on the land of the Appellants (R. 69-96). In 
fact, on Page 96 of the Record, Mr. Sine, one of the 
Appellants, was asked concerning the effect of the 
construction of 6 motel units as proposed by Western 
Travel, Inc., on the tract of land in question: 
14 
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"Q. Would it materially damage or affect your 
other property interests? 
"A. I don't think the six units would, no." 
The trial court found that there was no benefit 
running to the Appellants and only a detriment to 
the land of the Respondent (Finding of Fact 13, Find-
ing of Fact 25) .. It is interesting to observe that the 
Appellants have not taken an appeal from these Find-
ings of Fact. Since there has been no appeal taken 
from these Findings, the same must be considered as 
admitted and certainly there is no reason for continuing 
the restriction unless there is a benefit to be realized 
by the Appellants. 
A discussion of the law on the subject is found in 
14 Am. Jur. 649, Section 305, wherein it is stated: 
"The test for determining whether restrictions 
imposed by deed on the use of property conveyed 
should be declared by a court of equity to be 
extinguished as a cloud on title has been said to 
be whether the original purpose and intention 
of the parties can be reasonably carried out in the 
light of the materially changed conditions." 
The Supreme Court of California in Hurd v. 
Albert, 3 Pac. 2d 545; 76 A.L.R. 1348, which appears 
to be a leading case on the subject, said on Page 1354 
A.L.R.: 
"We are of the opinion, after reading the 
record, that the above findings are all supported 
by substantial evidence, and cannot be disturbed 
on appeal. Such findings are ample to sustain a 
15 
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judgment denying injunctive relief. Whatever 
may be the weight of authority in other juris-
dictions, the rule in this jurisdiction is well set-
tled and the equity courts will not enforce re-
strictive covenants by injunction in a case where, 
by reason of a change in the character of the 
surrounding neighborhood, not resulting from 
a breach of the covenants, it would be oppressive 
and inequitable to give the restriction effect, as 
where the enforcement of the covenant would 
have no other result than to harass or injure 
the defendants, without benefiting the plaintiff." 
"And so though the contract was fair and just 
when made, the interference of the court should 
be denied, if subsequent events have made per-
formance by the Defendant so onerous that its 
enforcement would impose great hardship upon 
him, and cause little or no benefit to the Plain-
, tiff." 
See also Wolff v. Fallon (Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia) 284 P.2d 802; and see also Whitmarcbv. Rich-
mond, 20 A.2d 161; 179 Md. 523, which interprets sub-
stantial benefit. And, Barton v. Moline Properties, 
121 Fla. 683; 164 Southern 551; 103 A.L.R. 725, which 
establishes the doctrine of substantial benefit to the 
dominant lot as a test for maintaining the restrictive 
covenant. 
A covenant will not be enforced if there has been 
a substantial change in the character and circumstances 
of the neighborhood. In the case before this Court, the 
trial court found that there was a change in the character 
and circumstances in the neighborhood, as discussed 
16 
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previously under Point I. We contend that the Finding 
of :Fact is a factual matter which cannot be disputed 
on appeal. See: 14 Am. Jur. 646, Section 302: 
"A change in the character of the neighbor-
hood which was intended to be created by re-
strictions has generally been held to prevent 
their enforcement in equity, where it is no longer 
possible to accomplish the purpose intended by 
such covenant, * * * . In fact, equity may remove 
restrictions as a cloud on title in such a case." 
See also 14 Am. J ur. 668, Section 344; Restate-
ment of Property, Section 539, Comment (f) ; 26 C.J .S. 
1175, Section 171. Cases on this subject are: Price v. 
Anderson, 358 Pa. 209; 56 A.2d 215; 2 A.L.R. 2d 593; 
Sanders v. McAmmon (Oklahoma) 365 P .2d 730; 
Woods v. Knox (Oklahoma) 277 P.2d 982; Wiltoff v. 
Kohl (New Jersey) 147 Atl. 930; 66 A.L.R. 1317. 
See also Annotations 54 A.L.R. 812; 88 A.L.R. 405; 
103 A.L.R. 734, and 4 A.L.R. 2d 1111. 
In the case of Price v. Anderson, cited hereinabove, 
the Court there stated, in part, as fallows : 
"It is an elementary principal of equity juris-
prudence that such a decided change of condi-
tions makes it improper for a Chancellor to 
enforce a covenant which limits the full right of 
an owner to develop his property; this is because 
public policy dictates that land shall not be un-
necessarily burdened with permanent or long 
continued restrictions and because equity will 
not retard improvements simply in order to 
sustain the literal or technical observance of a 
covenant which for one reason or another has 
17 
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become useless from the standpoint of any prac-
tical utility." (Cases there cited). 
"Seizing upon the words 'substantial value', 
Plaintiffs claim that, regardless of whatever 
changes have occurred, the restrictive covenant 
remains of real value to them· because it enables 
them to retain the control of commercial uses as 
an asset enhancing the rental and sale value of 
their presently unsold property and true it is 
that, if they can have the sole and unrestricted 
right to erect and lease store properties on the 
tracts retained by them and can prevent Defend-
ant from erecting stores which would compete 
with ·those now erected and that may hereafter 
be erected on their own retained ·land, such a 
monopoly might well constitute a valuable right. 
But that is not the kind of value to which the 
applicable principal of equity relates,. The value 
referred to in the authorities is the benefit to the 
owner of the dominent tenemant in the 'physical 
use or enjoyment of land possessed by him.' " 
A covenant is only enforceable for a reasonable 
period of time where no time is specified in the restric-
tion, which is the situation here. See 14 Am . .J ur. 484!, 
Section 5. In this citation it is said: 
"The duration of restrictive covenants, if not 
specifically limited by the conveyances, is for a 
reasonable time, considering the nature of cir-
cumstances of and the purpose of their imposi-
tion.'' · 
Covenants will not be enforced after there has been 
a change in the locality or neighborhood as to render 
the restriction ~f little substantial value to the dominant 
18 
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lots. Here the neighborhood has changed in character, 
a question of fact, and therefore, the covenant has ex-
pired through the lapse of a reasonable time. See Mc-
Clintock on Equity, Page 221, Section 123; 95 A.L.R. 
458; Powell on Real Property, Vol. 5, Page 216, Sec-
tion 684; and Norris v. Williams, 54 A.2d 331; 4 A.L.R. 
2d 1106. 
A court of equity should not enforce the restriction 
imposed upon the tract of land in question for the rea-
son that the enforcement of that restriction would not 
effectuate the purpose for which it was imposed. The 
Appellant, Mr. Sine, testified that the purpose of the 
restriction was to prevent the construction of a large 
motel between 2nd and 3rd West on North Temple 
Street (R. 68 )·. He further testified that the property 
itself was not large enough to be of real value as a 
motel site but purchased same to keep a large motel 
from being developed (R. 53, 54), and later stated that 
the restriction was imposed to prevent someone else 
from developing a motel (R. 70). Mr. Sine testified 
that he imposed the restriction on this small parcel of 
land, intending that this piece of property was the 
ukeyn to a motel site and would prevent a large motel 
from being constructed between 2nd and 3rd West on 
North Temple Street. '\V estern Travel, Inc., plans to 
construct a large motel containing between 124 to 140 
units between 2nd and 3rd West on North Temple 
Street whether the restriction on this small parcel is 
held invalid or not (R. 83, 84). Since a large motel will 
be constructed on the property surrounding the subject 
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prope:rty, the purpose of the restriction c:;tnnot be 
realized regardless. of the outcome of. this lawsuit. A 
court of equity will not enforce the bare right of the 
Appellants when it will provide 110 bepefit to them and 
only impose a, detriment on the use of. the property ,by 
Respondent. 
Dean Pound in his discussion on covenants in 33 
Harvard Law Review, beginning at Page. 171,. said: 
"When the purpose of the restriction can no 
longer be carried. out, the servitude comes to an 
end." 
The Supreme Court of Florida in Osius v. Barton, 
147 So. 862; 88 .A;.L.R. 395, said: 
'' ·* '* * that the general p<;>licy of the law to 
dispense with . encumbrances on title shall pre-
' vail, where enforcement of restrictive covenants 
is no longer of general usefulness, nor capable 
of serving the purposes for w4ich the restrictions 
were imposed~ Cl,ark on Covenants and Interests 
Running, with Land, supra, ·163-165; Jackson 
v. Stevenson, 156 Mass. 496, 31 N.E. 691, 32 
Am. St. Rep. 476." 
See also Hurdv. Albert, supra, and Price v. Anderson, 
supra. 
The trial court found that the Appellants imposed 
a restrict~on for the purpose of controlling and op-
pressing the development of the block within which 
th~ property is located and to prevent competition with 
their busines~ located some 3 blocl):s West of the subject 
property (R. 121). The Appellant, Mr. Sine, freely 
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admitted that this was his purpose in imposing the 
restriction ( R. 68-70) . An agreement not to engage 
in a business in competition with the Seller will only 
be enforced if the restriction is reasonable and not 
against public policy (36 Am. Jur. 530-531). The 
Appellants did not intend to prohibit the construction 
of a motel on this piece of property having only a 
frontage of 40 feet on North Temple Street, because 
the tract was too small to support a motel development. 
Rather, their purpose was to prevent a motel from 
being constructed on the property having a frontage 
of approximately 288 feet on North Temple Street 
between 2nd and 3rd West Street, and a bold attempt 
by the Appellants to stifle and retard the development 
of a large piece of property on a street that is rapidly 
becoming a "motel row" in Salt Lake City, Utah, by 
the use of this restriction on the small piece of property 
which they considered to be the key to a large motel 
development. Certainly such a restriction is unreason-
able under any construction or interpretation. To 
attempt to restrict the development of this large block 
of property is against public policy and should not be 
allowed under any circumstances. See Price v. Ander-
son, supra, and Hurd v. Albert, supra. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The Appellants acquired this small tract of land 
in question for one principal purpose, i.e., to stymie 
or prevent the growth and development of the entire 
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block within .which. the subject property is located, 
in so far as the same could possibly be utilized for any 
motel operation or similar endeavor. Appellants admit 
that ,in so far as the utilization of the subject .property 
for a motel is concerned, there will be no material 
detriment to their . operations . and properties -locBtted 
some . 3 .to 4 blocks West thereof and separated by the 
wide expanse of railroad tracks. and viaduct. We. there-
fore fail to con1prehend any valid reason for the reten-
tion of the restriction. We are of . the opinion. that a 
court of equity should lend_ its assistance to permit and 
make possible the normal progressive development of 
the commercial district within which the subject prop .. 
erty is located and should not hesitate to strike down 
the ;restriction herein involved .. Certainly in any event, 
the restriction, if initially valid, has now elapsed and 
expired by reason of the lapse of reasonable time from 
the date of its imposition due to the change. and develop-
ment in the neighborhood and the fact that it bestows 
no benefit to Appellants. We respectfully submit that 
there exists an abundanqe of competent. evidence, · testi-
mony, and .law to .sustain the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions. of Law for the affirmance of the Decree 
rendered by the trial court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRANT H. \VALL 
Attorney for Plainti:tr-Respondent 
530 J' udge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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JACKSON B. HOWARD, for 
HOWARD and LEWIS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent 
290 North University Avenue 
Provo, Utah 
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